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the public good, Hudson Township and the Village of Hudson merged
creating the City of Hudson ("Hudson"). Hudson, five years later,
sought declaratory relief seeking control over the water system. A few
months later, the County inquired about possible buyers of the water
system. The City of Akron ("Akron") responded, but Hudson did not.
Soon after, Hudson moved for an emergency restraining order and a
preliminary injunction preventing the sale of the water system they
believed passed by the operation of law to them at the creation of
Hudson. The trial court, the Summit County Common Pleas Court,
determined the water system did not pass to Hudson by the operation
of law, and the County was free to sell the water system.
This court addressed whether a water system held in public trust in
a township is incorporated into a city at its creation, and whether a
county may sell a water system in one municipality to another
municipality. The Ohio Constitution art. XVII, § 4 provides that any
municipality may acquire, construct, own, lease and operate within or
without its corporate limits, any public utility. Further, the Ohio
Revised Code § 6103.22 provides that a water works system may be
acquired by mutual agreement or conveyance. Hudson allowed the
County to operate the water system for five years without objection.
Moreover, the language of the Ohio Constitution suggests the water
system may be acquired only by an affirmative act. Hudson could have
obtained control over the water system by eminent domain. The
Revised Code suggests Hudson also could have gained control through
an agreement with the County or through a conveyance. No language
suggested the water system passed by the operation of law. Thus, the
court held the water system remained in the County's control.
Regarding the second issue, the court again looked to the Ohio
Revised Code. Sections 6103.21 and 6103.22 are interrelated. The
former addresses the contractual and payment responsibilities, as well
as the party's rights. The latter relates to the transfer of a completed
water system. The court found a county may only transfer ownership
to the municipality the water facility serves. Therefore, the County
could only transfer the water system to Hudson, but remained in
control of the water system because no agreement or affirmative act
transferred the water system from the County to Hudson.
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PENNSYLVANIA
Segal v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 771 A.2d 90 (Pa. Conunw.Ct. 2001)
(holding the filling of wetlands and waters of the United States did not
constitute a dimensional variance, and the filling of wetlands based on
a self-imposed hardship was not authorized).

Issue 1

COURT REPORTS

Allen and Gary Segal ("Segals") appealed the denial by the Zoning
Hearing Board of Buckingham Township ("Board") of two of their
variance requests for their property. The Court of Common Pleas of
Bucks County ("Common Pleas Court") affirmed the Board's decision,
as did this court. The Segals owned property in an AG-1 Agricultural
District, where they operated a life care facility. The property
contained 15.5 acres of wetlands. The Segals wished to expand their
life care facility, and build two roads, one that connected the existing
building to the expansion and another that provided access to the
expansion without crossing the existing parking lots. Both proposed
roads crossed the wetlands.
A Buckingham Township Zoning
Ordinance prohibits the filling of wetlands and the waters of
Pennsylvania.
The Board heard the Segals' requests on March 15, 1995. An
engineer with project design experience testified on behalf of the
Segals. He stressed the importance of the road for safety reasons, but
admitted the expansion would occur even without the new road. The
Board granted the request for the road connecting the expansion to
the existing building thus allowing the Segals to fill 0.02 acres of
wetlands, but denied the request for the other road that would cross
the wetlands because the construction of the second road did not
affect the project.
On appeal, the Segals contended that the fact that the
construction of the new buildings would occur without the new road
was irrelevant. They asserted a dimensional variance is different from
a use variance, and the physical condition of their land was unique and
resulted in difficulties that could not be remedied without expending
substantial money to construct a bridge to span the wetlands. Since
the court determined the variance was not dimensional, the Segals
needed to meet the five criteria laid out in 53 P.A. § 910.2 in order to
obtain a variance. The third criterion required that the applicant not
create unnecessary hardship. Unnecessary hardship is established if
the applicant proves either the physical characteristics of the property
are such that the property cannot be used for any permitted purpose
or only for a permitted purpose at prohibitive expense; or the
characteristics of the property are such that it would have no value or
only distress value for any use approved by the zoning ordinance.
Here, the Segals would continue to use the property in the same
permitted manner. Therefore, the Board determined the Segals failed
to prove unnecessary hardship and further, the hardship was selfimposed.
The court found substantial evidence supported the
decision of the Board, and therefore the Board had not abused its
discretion or commited an error of law.
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